This addendum consists of 14 pages.
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET MISSILES IN CUBA INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN 1962?

SOURCE 1A

The extract below focuses on the relationship that Cuba had with the Soviet Union.

Cuba's ties to the USSR were strengthened by two of Castro's closest advisers – his brother, Raul Castro, and the legendary revolutionary, Che Guevara. Both men shared the communist ideology of the Soviets … Castro came to believe that the Americans would invade Cuba no matter what. This fear drove him into the arms of the Soviets. Soon the USSR and its allies were providing military aid and weapons to Cuba.

Khrushchev and the Soviets couldn't have asked for a better-located ally against the United States. The Americans had allies all over the Eastern Hemisphere, surrounding the USSR. The United States had a huge number of military forces in Europe near Soviet borders … It was well-known that the United States had nuclear missiles in Turkey, which were pointed at the Soviet Union.

While the United States had forces surrounding the USSR, the Soviet had no military presence at all in the Western Hemisphere. They did not even have aircraft carriers to put their planes within striking distance of the US mainland. But the new alliance between Cuba and the USSR changed all that, giving Khrushchev and the Soviets a military base less than 100 miles (161 km) from the United States. After the Soviets moved missiles to Cuba, the global balance of power would shift. That was something the US government would not allow.

[From The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War by PJ Byrne]
The source below focuses on how President Kennedy reacted to the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Kennedy and his advisers were debating what to do about the missiles in Cuba. On Tuesday 16 October, the same morning he learned about the photographs, the President immediately called for a meeting. Kennedy and his advisers gathered before noon in the White House cabinet room.

Joining the President in the large room were several intelligence officers, who presented the photographs and pointed out details showing the missiles. They were found in the area around San Cristobal, located in western Cuba. The President and his advisers pored (scrutinised) over the evidence, asking the intelligence officers questions about the photographs and the missiles. They wondered if there may have been more missiles in Cuba not seen in these spy photos.

Along with key members of his Cabinet, the President assembled a team of experts to help him determine what to do. Most of these advisers were part of the President’s administration, but Kennedy also sought the advice of people outside his government who were experts on Soviet relations. This group became known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ‘ExComm’ for short. … The young President knew he needed all the advice he could get.

[From The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War by PJ Byrne]
SOURCE 1C

The cartoon below is titled 'Drop it!'. It depicts an eagle attempting to catch a mouse that is carrying a missile.

The Soviet government stands for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, against the interference of one state into the internal affairs of others, and against the intervention of large states into the affairs of small countries.

It is well known to you, Mr President (Kennedy), the attitude of the Soviet government and personally, of Nikita Khrushchev toward the dangerous developments connected with the USA administration position on the issue of Cuba. An unrestrained anti-Cuban campaign has been going on in the USA for a long time and apparently there is a definite USA administration policy behind it. Right now the USA is making an attempt to blockade Cuban trade with other states. There is talk about a possibility of actions of organised policy in this region under the USA aegis (protection).

… The USA administration for some reason considers that the Cubans must solve their domestic affairs not at their discretion (choice), but at the discretion of the USA. But on what grounds? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people, not to the USA or any other state. And since it is so, then why are there statements made in the USA calling for an invasion of Cuba? What does the USA need Cuba for?

Who can in earnest believe that Cuba represents a threat to the USA? If we speak about dimensions and resources of the two countries, the USA and Cuba, then it is clear that they are a giant and a baby. The flagrant (deliberate) groundlessness (baseless) of such charges against Cuba is obvious.

[From New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis by J Hershberg]
QUESTION 2: HOW DID FOREIGN POWERS INTERVENE IN POST-INDEPENDENT ANGOLA?

SOURCE 2A

This extract focuses on the process of decolonisation in Angola that began in 1975. It was written by the historian, Alexandra Kaure.

The transition to independence in Angola was spoiled by violence, division and foreign intervention. The armed struggle against the authoritarian and uncompromising Portuguese colonial regime started in 1961 and involved three rival movements: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) … The hastily (quickly) concluded Alvor Agreement of 15 January 1975, signed between the Portuguese government and the three nationalist movements, promised independence on 11 November of the same year.

The Alvor Agreement stated that a transitional government of national unity including the three movements and Portugal was put in place and each ministry held by one party should have two secretaries of state, one from each of the rival parties …

Also contained in the Agreement was provision for the establishment of a national army consisting of 8 000 men from each movement and 24 000 Portuguese troops, making a force of 48 000 in all. The Portuguese troops were to remain in Angola until 19 February 1976 … Another proviso (point) under Article 40 of the Alvor Agreement was that the transitional government must organise general elections to a constituent assembly within nine months of 31 January 1975. But these arrangements were not to last long.

By July 1975, the transitional government had collapsed due to mutual distrust among the three groups, which had led to outbreaks of fighting.

[From Angola from Socialism to Liberal Reforms by A Kaure]
SOURCE 2B

The photograph below shows Agostinho Neto (MPLA), Holden Roberto (FNLA) and Jonas Savimbi (UNITA) in discussion at the Alvor Summit that was held in Portugal. It was published in the News Diary of Lisbon, a Portuguese newspaper on 15 January 1975.

SOURCE 2C

The extract below explains how foreign powers became involved in Angola during the mid-1970s. It was written by Victoria Brittain, a journalist who spent ten years working in Angola.

When the red and black flag with the yellow star representing independent Angola was raised over Luanda on 11 November 1975, ending the repressive blood-soaked years of Portuguese colonialism, it was a victory for Africa's liberation movement, but a victory with a political and emotional resonance (meaning) well beyond the continent … Angola’s hard won independence was a pledge to millions further south on the continent that liberation of the rest of the continent was possible …

… Angola's natural resources, including oil and diamonds, its size and its strategic location made it a prize so tempting that the big powers did not for a moment dream of leaving the future direction to Angolans …

The Americans falsified (made-up) the history of Angola in 1975 to create a Soviet and Cuban threat to the region which, at the height of the Cold War, had to be countered. The MPLA, they claimed, never intended to share power with the other two parties and was planning with the Soviets and Cubans to crush the FNLA and UNITA militarily, giving the Soviet Union a strategic foothold in a key region of Africa.

The realities were very different. In Washington in January 1975, Henry Kissinger and the committee of 40 authorised 300 000 dollars for the MPLA’s main rival group, the FNLA. The FNLA leader, Holden Roberto, had been on the CIA payroll since 1961 … the Americans also stepped up military support for UNITA, and throughout the year ambushes and assassinations of the MPLA by its two rivals destabilised the country and made a mockery of power-sharing within the transitional government. And, most importantly, the Americans gave the nod to Pretoria to mount an ambitious military adventure …

[From Death of Dignity by V Brittain]
SOURCE 2D

This source focuses on what occurred in post-independent Angola. It was written by General Jannie Geldenhuys (Chief of the South African Defence Force from 1985 to 1990).

In terms of an agreement signed in January 1975 in the Portuguese town of Alvor, the Portuguese transferred power in Angola to a 'Government of National Unity' …

This interim government was supposed to rule until a general election had been held, with independence taking place on 11 November, but it did not happen that way. Because of its own internal problems Portugal could not or would not exert any real influence during the transition period. The interim government disintegrated and, with the help of Cuban troops the MPLA, soon became the sole (only) rulers in the capital Luanda. Roberto (FNLA) and Savimbi (UNITA) took to the bush, from where they declared war on the MPLA. Soon Angola was a battleground …

It will be remembered that during the 1960s and 1970s and thereafter, the pattern was for the big powers to take sides and become involved in regional and local conflicts and they secured the active participation of their allies. The United States of America was the leader of the West and the Soviet Union of the East and the participation on almost every continent of the Americans with their allies and the Soviets with theirs is common knowledge … This is the international ‘Cold War’ background against which the conflicts of that time must be seen.

In Angola the Soviet Union, Cuba and various Eastern Bloc countries supported Augustino Neto and the MPLA. America became involved on the side of Holden Roberto and the FNLA, who in turn formed an alliance with Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. And so South Africa, with the war on its doorstep, became part of the anti-Marxist alliance.

[From At the Front. A General's Account of South Africa's Border War by J Geldenhuys]
QUESTION 3: WHAT IMPACT DID THE BLACK POWER MOVEMENT HAVE ON AFRICAN AMERICANS DURING THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The extract below explains the reasons for the establishment of the Black Power Movement in the United States of America during the 1960s.

The Black Power Movement grew out of the Civil Rights Movement that had steadily gained momentum through the 1950s and 1960s. Although not a formal movement, the Black Power Movement marked a turning point in black-white relations in the United States and also in how blacks saw themselves. The movement was hailed (welcomed) by some as a positive and proactive force aimed at helping blacks achieve full equality with whites, but it was reviled (hated) by others as a militant, sometimes violent faction whose primary goal was to drive a wedge (division) between whites and blacks. In truth, the Black Power Movement was a complex event that took place at a time when society and culture were being transformed throughout the United States, and its legacy reflects that complexity.

Blacks still faced lower wages than whites, higher crime rates in their neighbourhoods, and unspoken but palpable (deep) racial discrimination. Young blacks in particular saw the Civil Rights Movement as too mainstream to generate real social change. What they wanted was something that would accelerate (quicken) the process and give blacks the same opportunities as whites, not just socially but also economically and politically. Perhaps more important, they felt that the Civil Rights Movement was based more on white perceptions of civil rights than black perceptions.

By the mid-1960s, dissatisfaction with the pace of change was growing among blacks. The term 'black power' had been around since the 1950s, but it was Stokely Carmichael, head of the Student Non-violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), who popularised the term in 1966.

SOURCE 3B

This extract focuses on Stokely Carmichael's views about the philosophy of Black Power. It is taken from a speech that Carmichael delivered at the University of California, Berkeley, on 28 July 1966.

When we form coalitions (partnerships) we must say on what grounds we are going to form them, not white people telling us how to form them. We must build strength and pride amongst ourselves. We must think politically and get power because we are the only people in this country that are powerless. We are the only people who have to protect ourselves from our protectors. We are the only people who want a man called Willis removed who is a racist, that have to lie down in the street and beg a racist named Daley to remove the racist named Willis. We have to build a movement so we can see Daley and say, 'Tell Willis to get hat,' and by the time we turn around he is gone. That's Black Power.

Everybody in this country is for 'Freedom Now' but not everybody is for Black Power because we have got to get rid of some of the people who have white power. We have got to get us some Black Power. We don't control anything but what white people say we can control. We have to be able to smash any political machine in the country that's oppressing us and bring it to its knees.

We have to be aware that if we keep growing and multiplying the way we do in ten years all the major cities are going to be ours. We have to know that in Newark, New Jersey, where we are sixty per cent of the population, we went along with their stories about integrating and we got absorbed. All we have to show for it is three councilmen who are speaking for them and not for us. We have to organise ourselves to speak for each other. That's Black Power. We have to move to control the economics and politics of our community ...

The poster below is an image of Black Power activist and feminist, Angela Davis. Around the border of the poster the words 'POWER TO THE PEOPLE' are written. These words have been re-typed for clarity.

SOURCE 3D

The source below explains how the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) tried to prevent the Black Power Movement from undertaking its activities.

The FBI set out to eliminate radical black political opposition inside the USA. When traditional modes of repression (blatant harassment) failed to counter the growing insurgency (uprising) and even helped to fuel it, the Bureau took the law into its own hands and secretly used fraud and force to sabotage constitutionally protected political activity.

The FBI secretly instructed its field offices to propose schemes to misdirect, discredit, disrupt and otherwise neutralise specific individuals and groups. Close coordination (working together) with the local police and prosecutors was encouraged.

The most intense operations were directed against the Black Power Movement particularly the Black Panther Party. This resulted from FBI and police racism. The black community's lack of material resources for fighting back, and the tendency of the media and whites in general to ignore or tolerate attacks on black groups, worsened their situation. It also reflected government and corporate fear of the Black Power Movement because of its militancy. The Black Panthers came under attack at a time when they provided free food, free health care and free community-based education. Therefor they were forced to carry guns.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:


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