SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS/
NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS

HISTORY P1
2019
ADDENDUM

This addendum consists of 14 pages.
QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION USE BRINKMANSHIP TO RESOLVE THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS?

SOURCE 1A

The source below outlines the discussions that members of the Executive Committee (ExComm) from the United States of America held regarding the deployment of Soviet missiles to Cuba.

The kinds of people involved in the ExComm meetings were diverse (different) and even conflicting in their opinions. From the most conservative, probably General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or Dean Acheson, to the most liberal, Adlai Stevenson, they encompassed (included) a broad spectrum (variety) of political opinion.

The conservative extreme, represented by Acheson and Taylor favoured an out and out military showdown. Acheson himself saw the entire affair as a test of wills, and believed the only respectable course of action for the United States was a decisive air strike. General Taylor, along with the other Joint Chiefs, strongly supported Acheson's position. At the opposite end of the hawk-dove continuum (range) was Stevenson. He proposed withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey and Italy in return for the Soviets doing the same in Cuba. The reaction to this from other ExComm members was a swift and overwhelming negative.

The reasons most clearly articulated (voiced) by Robert Kennedy against the strike were that it would have brought death to thousands of innocent Cuban civilians and to thousands of US military personnel. Also, such attacks ran the risk of triggering the launch of nuclear weapons. Kennedy himself wrote that a 'surprise attack would erode if not destroy the moral positions of the US throughout the world' … Some favoured the blockade because it offered more flexibility and fewer liabilities than a military attack. The attack would create an all-or-nothing situation for both the US and the Soviet Union. It didn't allow time for the Soviets to freely consider their position and comply with American wishes. It provided for no diplomatic manoeuvring (strategy) by which a peaceful solution could be found.

SOURCE 1B

The source below is a headline from an American newspaper, the *Daily News*. It was published on 23 October 1962.

SOURCE 1C

The letter below was written by President Khrushchev (Soviet Union) to President Kennedy (United States of America) on 24 October 1962. It outlines Khrushchev’s reaction to the American blockade of Soviet ships that intended entering Cuba.

You, Mr President, are not declaring quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. And you want me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to this? It would mean guiding oneself in one’s relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness (lack of logic). You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate (scare) us.

No, Mr President, I cannot agree to this and I think that in your own heart you recognise that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

The Soviet government considers the violation of the freedom of navigation (movement) in international waters and air space to constitute an act of aggression propelling (pushing) humankind into the abyss (depth) of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore the Soviet government cannot instruct captains of Soviet ships bound for Cuba to observe orders of American naval forces blockading this island.

Our instructions to Soviet sailors are to observe strictly the generally accepted standards of navigation in international waters and not retreat one step from them. And, if the American side violates these rights, it must be aware of the responsibility it will bear for this act. To be sure, we will not remain mere observers of pirate actions by American ships in the open seas. We will then be forced on our part to take those measures we deem necessary and sufficient to defend our rights. To this end we have all that is necessary.

Respectfully

N Khrushchev

Moscow

24 October 1962

SOURCE 1D

The source below focuses on how the Soviet Union responded to the naval blockade that the United States of America imposed in the Atlantic Ocean.

As ships bound for Cuba approached the quarantine line, no one was sure what would happen. Khrushchev had warned that his Soviet ships would not turn back, and that he would have his submarines sink American ships if they interfered with Soviet vessels on their way to Cuba.

The Americans knew where the approaching ships were in the Atlantic Ocean from radar and surveillance planes, and they had plotted (planned) the courses of ships suspected of carrying missiles or other weapons.

The President and government officials at the White House had direct lines of communication with naval commanders as US ships began coming into contact with the foreign vessels late on Wednesday morning. President Kennedy and other US government officials feared that a Soviet submarine might try to defend the incoming ships by taking action against American warships and that this would lead to a larger confrontation.

The tension eased, however, as reports came in that some of the Soviet ships were changing course to avoid the quarantine line. More than half of the ships being monitored reversed course, including those suspected of having missiles and other weapons on board.

Khrushchev must have given the order for these ships to alter course at the last minute. However, other ships kept steaming toward Cuba. These were civilian, not military ships, but they were still expected to stop if intercepted by US warships.

[From The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War by PJ Byrne]
QUESTION 2: WHAT WERE THE DIFFERING VIEWS REGARDING THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE?

SOURCE 2A

This source outlines how Cuba got involved in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale from 1987 onwards.

Before the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Soviet General Konstantin met Fidel Castro in Havana. In one version of the meeting Konstantin believed that the Cubans were not eager (willing) to fight and it was necessary to compel (force) them to be more active in the interest of the cause. It would appear that the Cubans were not unwilling to fight, but disagreed with Soviet battlefield strategy, correctly as it would later appear at Cuito Cuanavale.

Commander in Chief Castro explained the reason for such an attitude to the Soviet general: 'In your country the losses may be unnoticeable, but in our small country the human losses become known and have a great effect, therefore we are really trying to avoid losses in Angola.'

For Cuito Cuanavale, the fluid (unpredictable) skirmishes (fights) during that period led to a radical change to Cuban military frontline leadership for the defence of the town. The command and strategic control of the defence stayed in Havana at all relevant times, and the eventual outcome proved that Cuban commander in chief, Fidel Castro, was a capable military leader, even by remote. Castro had advised the Angolan leader, Dos Santos, to adopt a two-part strategy of reinforcing Cuito and pressuring South African bases near Namibia with joint Cuban and FAPLA patrols.

[From South Africa vs Cuba in the Angolan Civil War – The Last Hot Battle of the Cold War by P Pollack]
SOURCE 2B

The extract below outlines how members of the South African Military Veterans Organisation of the United States of America (SAMVOUSA) viewed the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

In 1988 the Angolan Minister of Defence and other official Angolan and Cuban sources claimed that a South African offensive consisting of up to 9,000 troops with 500 tanks, 600 artillery field guns and scores of aircraft had attacked the town of Cuito Cuanavale in Angola. According to their version (account) the attack had failed thanks to a valiant (brave) defence by Cuban and Angolan troops.

The Cuban propaganda version of this 'heroic battle' was widely believed in the West, and it was not until after the war had ended that the facts emerged. By the end of 1987, when the Cubans and Angolans were supposed to have achieved their great victory, they were already suing (asking) for peace in Angola, with their Soviet backers openly stating that the war there could not be won. In the negotiations that followed, one of the conditions of the Cubans was that they be allowed to make an honourable withdrawal from the war, an unusual demand to be made by a victorious army, to say the least. The fact is the Cubans knew that they were losing but did not want to withdraw from Angola in disgrace. The South Africans, who had been the real victors in the Cuito campaign, realised that making the full facts known at that delicate stage in the peace negotiations would humiliate the Cubans and their Soviet backers and perhaps spur (encourage) them into sending yet more troops to Angola in an effort to save their reputation. Making the Cubans look ridiculous would serve no useful purpose.

However, once the Cuban and Soviet involvement in the war had ended and the South Africans had withdrawn their troops, it did not take long for the real story of the battle to emerge.

SOURCE 2C

The following photograph shows MPLA soldiers standing on a captured South African military tank in Cuito Cuanavale in August 1988.

SOURCE 2D

The source below is a statement that the African National Congress (ANC) issued on 23 March 2018 regarding the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

Today marks the 30th anniversary of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. The African National Congress joins the international community in observing this historic encounter since the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988.

The momentous (historic) victory in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale against the then South African Defence Force marked a turning point in the struggle for liberation and it forced the apartheid regime to sign peace accords in 1988 in Angola, Cuba and the United States.

While still in prison on Robben Island, Comrade Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela recalled: 'Cuito Cuanavale marks the turn in the struggle to liberate the continent and our country from apartheid; the defeat of the racist army in Cuito Cuanavale allowed the people of Namibia to finally reach their liberation; the defeat of apartheid served as inspiration for the fighting people of South Africa.' The victory of Angolan and Cuban troops in that war indeed marked a turning point in the war against the Angolan people, laying the basis for the independence of Namibia and contributing to the eventual commencement of negotiations in South Africa.

The ANC extend its best wishes to the people of Angola, Cuba, Namibia and South Africa on this occasion of the 30th anniversary. The ANC salutes cadres of MK who sacrificed for the independence of Namibian people.

[From http://www.anc.org/content/30 years-anc-member-battle-cuito-cuanavale. Accessed on 24 April 2018.]
QUESTION 3: HOW SUCCESSFUL WAS THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY IN MOBILISING AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The source below outlines the reasons for the formation of the Black Panther Party. It was written by Bobby Searle in 1966.

In 1966, numerous acts of police brutality had sparked a lot of spontaneous (unplanned) riots, something that Huey and I were against, these spontaneous riots. And Huey and I began to try to figure out how we could organise youthful black folks into some kind of political, electoral, power movement. Stokely Carmichael was on the scene with Black Power.

Huey and I had been involved for some time, off and on, studying black history on what Malcolm X had done, where Martin Luther King Jr came from … Largely the Black Panther Party came out of a lot of reading …

At that time Huey and I were working with the North Oakland (an area in California, USA) Neighbourhood Anti-poverty Centre, on the advisory board. We got five thousand signatures for them to go to the city council, to get the city council to set up a police review board to deal with complaints of police brutality. Well the city council ignored us … [it] was just a racist structure which could not care less about the forty per cent black and Chicano* who lived in the city of Oakland. So there we are, trying to figure out what to do. We finally concluded through those months we had to start a new organisation … We sat down and began to write out this 10-point plan programme.

[From Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement from the 1950s through the 1980s by H Hampton and S Fayer]

*Chicano is a name that was given to people of Central and South American descent
The source below outlines the Ten-point Plan or Manifesto of the Black Panther Party. It was published on 15 October 1966.

1. We want freedom. We want the power to run our black and oppressed communities.

2. We want full employment for our people.

3. We want an end to the capitalist exploitation of our black and oppressed communities.

4. We want decent housing, fit for human beings.

5. We want a decent education for our people that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

6. We want completely free healthcare for all black and oppressed people.

7. We want an immediate end to police brutality and murder of black people, other people of colour, and all oppressed people inside the US.

8. We want an immediate end to all wars of aggression.

9. We want freedom for all black and oppressed people now held in US federal, state, county, city and military prisons and jails. We want trials by a jury of peers for all persons charged with so-called crimes under the laws of this country.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice, peace and people’s community control of modern technology.

SOURCE 3C

The photograph below shows armed members of the Black Panther Party who marched into the California legislature in May 1967.

The extract below focuses on reasons for the collapse of the Black Panther Party in the late 1960s.

The success of the Panther’s political activities and community programmes and their huge growth and influence and membership soon brought them under fire from the American state. The FBI intensified the COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Programme) against them. Nearly every office in the country was raided at some point. In Chicago, all the food provisions for the breakfast programme were burnt out. During one raid in the spring of 1968, Bobby Hutton, the party’s first member, came out with his hands up. The police shot him in the head and killed him … In 1969 alone, 25 Panther members were killed. But the FBI’s operations went further. Aside from the constant arrests of Panther members which disrupted the work of the organisation and drained them financially, the FBI infiltrated (penetrated) the party and manufactured rivalries and disputes between different members.

Today, some would explain the demise (end) of the Panthers as due to the successful operations of the FBI. Undoubtedly, this placed an enormous strain on the organisation, but there are a number of other factors which contributed …

Huey Newton says in his book, Revolutionary Suicide, 'we soon discovered that weapons and uniforms set us apart from the community. We were looked upon as an ad hoc (informal) military group, acting outside the community fabric and too radical to be a part of it. Perhaps some of our tactics at the time were extreme (threatening) perhaps we placed too much emphasis on military action.'

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Byrne, PJ. 2006. *The Cuban Missile Crisis – To the Brink of War* (Compass Point Books, Minneapolis)


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