This addendum consists of 15 pages.
QUESTION 1: DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION INFLUENCE THE ENDING OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA?

SOURCE 1A

The following is an extract from *The Dream Deferred: Thabo Mbeki* by M Gevisser.

… Gorbachev made his strongest statement yet on the new Soviet foreign policy: 'We are resolutely against any form of export of revolution, or of counter-revolution.' Just a month previously [March 1989], the ANC had felt the first tangible effects of this policy: after a long-promised follow-up meeting to their first one in 1986, Gorbachev stood Tambo [Oliver] up in Moscow. This was a symptom of the profound shift in Soviet foreign policy, which now followed two imperatives: to end the Cold War and to staunch any further haemorrhaging of its resources (to put an end to the draining of its resources) towards foreign struggles that did not advance its own material interests. Spurred too by a kneejerk reaction against anything to do with the Soviet revolutionary past, the Russians had begun an almost unseemly embrace of the NP government in its dying years: by 1990 they had turned their backs almost entirely on the ANC.

The most tangible effect of this new approach was the agreement that the Soviet Union signed in late 1988 with South Africa, along with the US, Cuba and Angola. This terminated the Angolan and Namibian wars and paved the way for Namibia's independence. It also effectively terminated the ANC's own armed struggle: one of the terms was that all MK operatives had to leave Angola, and in early 1989 the Soviets airlifted the ANC's thousands of combatants to camps in Uganda, half a continent away from the front line. This, the MK leader Joe Modise later told me, was the moment the penny dropped for him that South Africa's only solution would be a negotiated one.

It was the end of the world as the ANC knew it. Both the Berlin Wall and PW Botha had fallen …
SOURCE 1B

This extract from *Tomorrow Is Another Country* by Allister Sparks focuses on how FW de Klerk reacted to Gorbachev's reform measures.

… in August 1989 De Klerk became leader of the National Party. As party leader De Klerk made several trips abroad – a rare experience for a governing politician from this pariah (outcast) country. He met Britain's Margaret Thatcher, Germany's Helmut Kohl, and the leaders of Portugal, Italy, Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Zambia and Zaire. All emphasised the need for South Africa to change …

But of all the international influences, none was greater than the Gorbachev reforms that began unravelling the communist empire, for they eased Pretoria's phobia that the black struggle against apartheid was a conspiracy directed from Moscow. It took the monkey off De Klerk's back and enabled him to justify to his people what would otherwise have appeared to them a suicidal course of action.

The negotiations which brought independence to neighbouring Namibia in October 1989 underscored this point. Now, as Gorbachev's Soviet Union began settling regional conflicts and removing points of friction with the United States, a deal was struck to have Cuban troops pull out of Angola in return for South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia. The South West African People's Organisation, an ANC clone, won the Namibian election and South Africa handed over the territory smoothly and peacefully to an enemy it had been fighting for thirty years. 'Namibia showed the South Africans that this kind of change would not necessarily have catastrophic results,' said Sir Robin Renwick, British ambassador in South Africa at the time.

Economic sanctions and campaigns to withdraw investment in South Africa added significantly to the pressures on De Klerk to act. These, together with the racial unrest, had plunged South Africa into the deepest financial crisis of its history. Business confidence was at an all-time low, and increasingly the cry was raised, 'We can't go on like this!'
SOURCE 1C

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the need for the ending of apartheid, FW de Klerk began a process of change and reform. One of the important reform measures announced by De Klerk was the unbanning of the ANC and other political organisations. Of particular significance was the release of political prisoners, as shown in the poster below, from Robben Island on 10 October 1989, namely Walter Sisulu, Oscar Mpetha, Ahmed Kathrada, Andrew Mlangeni, Elias Motsoaledi, Wilton Mkwayi and Raymond Mhlaba.
QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR CAUSE BENIN (WEST AFRICA) TO RE-IMAGINE ITSELF IN THE 1990s?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Benin is a West African country which was colonised by the French. After independence it became known as the Republic of Dahomey. The country followed a democratic system with a capitalist economy. It enjoyed a close relationship with the West, especially France.

In 1972 after a successful coup Major Mathieu Kerekou installed himself as the leader, who then abandoned Western democracy and the capitalist economy. He established a socialist state based on the principles of Marxism and Leninism. He nationalised all forms of production (such as land and industries). The name of the country was changed to the People's Republic of Benin or Benin which became a close ally of the USSR. It was referred to as the 'Cuba of Africa'.

The map of Africa below shows the position of Benin in West Africa.
SOURCE 2A

This extract taken from *Africa Since Independence* by P Nugent, focuses on the impact the end of the Cold War had on African states.

Events abroad, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, affected the clamour (outcry) for change. From the mid-1980s, as a result of Mikhail Gorbachev's 'new thinking' [Glasnost and Perestroika], the Soviet Union began to retreat from Africa, no longer willing or able to sustain client states [such as Benin] that had relied upon Soviet largesse (assistance) for survival. With the demise (downfall) of Marxism-Leninism in Europe came its demise in Africa.

The end of the Cold War, moreover, changed the West's attitudes towards Africa. Western governments no longer had strategic interests in propping up repressive regimes merely because they were friendly to the West. Along with the World Bank, they concluded that one-party regimes lacking popular participation constituted a serious hindrance to economic development and placed new emphasis on the need for democratic reform.

In June 1990 Britain declared that the distribution of its aid programme would henceforth favour countries 'tending towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights and market principles'.
The small West African state of Benin became the first to be caught up in the avalanche (sudden rush) of protest. Its military ruler, Mathieu Kerekou, and his cronies had looted the state-owned banking system so thoroughly that nothing was left to pay the salaries of teachers and civil servants, some of whom were owed as much as twelve months' backpay. Three state-owned banks had collapsed in 1988 as a result of large unsecured loans awarded to members of Kerekou's inner circle and the bogus companies they had set up, amounting in sum, according to the World Bank, to $500 million. With the entire state banking and credit system drained of all liquid funds, normal business activity ground to a halt; companies could not operate; traders could neither sell nor buy.

In January 1989, a student protest over unpaid grants grew into a general mobilisation against Kerekou's regime involving teachers, civil servants, workers and church groups. The army, too, was restless, bubbling with plots; unpaid soldiers hijacked shipments of banknotes sent in from abroad to alleviate the crisis. Only Kerekou's elite Presidential Guard, drawn exclusively from his northern ethnic group, remained loyal.

When Kerekou requested Western aid to pay salary arrears, he was turned down. In December 1989, forced to make concessions, he abandoned Marxism-Leninism as an official ideology and promised constitutional reform. Expecting to be able to manipulate events, he proposed a national conference at which business, professional, religious, labour and political groups, together with the government, would be given an opportunity to draw up a new constitutional framework. In what was intended to be a show of strength, he walked among demonstrators in downtown Cotonou but was booed and jostled. For the first time, government-controlled television screened pictures showing demonstrators waving anti-government placards.
SOURCE 2C

The following source contains two perspectives on the establishment of democracy in Benin.

**Perspective 1**: Focuses on Benin's first democratic elections. Adapted from *Africa Since Independence* by P Nugent.

Benin's legislative and presidential elections in 1991 were the country's first proper contest for power since independence. International observers judged them to have been generally free and fair. In the presidential election, Nicephore Soglo (World Bank official) stood against Kerekou, defeating him by a resounding margin of two to one. Following his defeat, Kerekou apologised for abusing power during his tenure of office, pledged his 'deep, sincere and irreversible desire for change' and was granted immunity from prosecution. Benin thus became the first African state in which the army was forced from power by civilians and the first in which an incumbent president was defeated at the polls.


… with the adoption of a new constitution and the birth of democracy in 1990 there was an expectation that Benin would be opened up and the political and economic system would be free. But by 1993 we southerners complained that 'democracy' had not changed anything; though political life was certainly more open and less repressive, the same elites (crooks) were in control.
SOURCE 2D

This cartoon (cartoonist and date of publication unknown) shows the USSR releasing its control of Africa.
QUESTION 3: WAS IT THE MAGNANIMITY (FAIRNESS) OF DE KLERK THAT PAVED THE WAY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?

SOURCE 3A

This is an extract from a speech President De Klerk made when he opened parliament on 2 February 1990.

'The General Elections on 6 September 1989 placed our country irrevocably on the road of drastic change. Underlying this is the growing realisation by an increasing number of South Africans that only a negotiated understanding among the representative leaders of the entire population is able to ensure lasting peace ... Today I am able to announce far-reaching decisions in this connection ... The steps that have been decided on are the following:

- The prohibition of the African National Congress, the Pan Africanist Congress, the South African Communist Party and a number of subsidiary organisations is being rescinded.

- People serving prison sentences merely because they were members of one of these organisations ... will be identified and released.

- The media emergency regulations as well as the education emergency regulations are being abolished in their entirety.

- The restrictions in terms of the emergency regulations on 33 organisations are being rescinded.

- The period of detention in terms of the security emergency regulations will be limited henceforth to six months.

... the Government has taken a firm decision to release Mr Nelson Mandela unconditionally.'
SOURCE 3B

This is an extract from *Long Walk to Freedom*, N Mandela, 1994.

'I told the crowd that apartheid had no future in South Africa, and that the people must not scale down their campaign of mass action. "The sight of freedom looming on the horizon should encourage us to redouble our efforts." I encouraged the people to return to the barricades, to intensify the struggle, that we would walk the last mile together.

The First National Bank stadium was so crowded that it looked as though it would burst. I expressed my delight to be back among them, but I then scolded the people for some crippling problems of urban life. 'Students must return to school. Crime must be brought under control.' I told them that I heard of criminals masquerading (pretending) as freedom fighters, harassing innocent people and setting alight vehicles, these rogues have no place in the struggle. Freedom without civility, Freedom without the ability to live in peace, was not true freedom at all.

I ended by opening my arms to all South Africans with goodwill and good intentions, saying that "no man or woman who abandoned apartheid will be excluded from our movement towards a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa based on one person one vote on a common voters' roll".'

SOURCE 3C

This is a cartoon by Bob Engelhart depicting Nelson Mandela as a bird flying out of a cage. It is taken from *Nelson Mandela, Life in Cartoons*, 1999.
QUESTION 4: WAS THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) SUCCESSFUL IN HEALING THE WOUNDS OF A DIVIDED SOUTH AFRICA?

SOURCE 4A


There are two crucial things that have come out of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The first is that it has achieved a remarkable and far-ranging public exposure of the human rights violations and crimes committed under the apartheid regime ... It has forced a previously reluctant population (though, of course, there is still denial at one level) to see that apartheid was morally indefensible; that is a crime against humanity. It has produced an archive which allows people to examine their past and hopefully learn from it.

Secondly, it has allowed ordinary people to find expression for the suffering under the regime. It has had a completely cathartic [therapeutic or healing] function for many of the victims ... It is in this sense that some form of reconciliation has already taken place.

SOURCE 4B

The source comprises three viewpoints relating to the TRC.

**Viewpoint 1:** This is an extract from the testimony of Mrs Msweli. She lived in KwaZulu-Natal and was an ANC supporter. Under apartheid, her house was burned down, two of her sons were killed and her grandchildren were kidnapped. One of her sons had been beaten so badly, she was only able to identify him from a particular mark he had on his thumb.

I want the people who killed my son to come forward because this is a time for reconciliation. I want to forgive them and I also have a bit of my mind to tell them. I would be happy if they can come forward, because I don't have my sons today ... I want to speak to them before I forgive them. I want them to tell me who sent them to come and kill my sons. Maybe they are my enemies, maybe they are not. So I want to establish as to who they are and why they did what they did.

(Viewpoint 2 on the next page)
**Viewpoint 2:** Dirk Coetzee was a state assassin. Although he had been tried and found guilty for his role in the murder of Griffiths Mxenge, he applied for and was granted amnesty. When asked how he felt about what he had done to the Mxenge family, he said this:

I feel humiliation, embarrassment and the hopelessness of a pathetic, 'I am sorry for what I have done.' ... What else can I offer them? A pathetic nothing, so in all honesty I don't expect the Mxenge family to forgive me, because I don't know how I ever in my life would be able to forgive a man like Dirk Coetzee, if he'd done to me what I did to them.

**Viewpoint 3:** Mathatha Tsedu, writing in the *Sowetan*, 1998.

We were moved by the testimony; the fears, the sobs and the wailing of survivors and relatives who could not take the memories and the revelations.

We cried a little too in our homes.

We also sat glued to the radio and television screens as killers of our patriots spoke of the murders they committed to defend white hegemony (power).

We hissed as the men, with no visible remorse, spoke of the pyres and burning of human bodies alongside the lamb chops and steak barbecues on the banks of various rivers of our land.

We got even more angry as the men walked away scot-free after such testimony.

**SOURCE 4C**

The following is an evaluation on the work of the TRC. It is taken from, *The Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a Model of Restorative Justice*, Traggy Maepa.

One of the greatest limitations to restoring victims' dignity – and which was largely beyond the control of the Commission – was the political tension that prevailed [existed] during its operations. This stemmed from the reluctance of the National Party and some extreme right-wing groups to see the TRC investigating aspects of the past that might damage their political credibility. These parties accused the TRC of being a 'witch-hunt' rather than a genuine tool for national reconciliation, and frustrated the Commission's work by [bringing about] frequent legal actions against the TRC. The Commission's biggest political blunder was the tendency to [give in] to these political groupings in an attempt to keep them committed to the process. ... [the] politically delicate task of the TRC worsened its relations with victims who were justifiably frustrated by the lack of proper justice that the position implied. For restorative justice to succeed, victims need to see offenders express remorse [regret]. That this was not forthcoming from the political party that governed the country under apartheid, dealt a severe blow to the process.
SOURCE 4D

This is a cartoon by Zapiro published in the *Sowetan* newspaper, 29 October 1998.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

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