This addendum consists of 14 pages.
QUESTION 1: WHY DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA GIVE FINANCIAL AID TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AFTER 1945?

SOURCE 1A

The extract below outlines why the European Recovery Programme was implemented in Europe after 1945.

In the aftermath (outcome) of World War II, Western Europe lay devastated. The war had ruined crop fields and destroyed infrastructure, leaving most of Europe in dire (desperate) need. On 5 June 1947 Secretary of State George Marshall announced the European Recovery Programme. To avoid antagonising (provoking) the Soviet Union, Marshall announced that the purpose of sending aid to Western Europe was completely humanitarian, and even offered aid to the communist states in the East. Congress approved Truman's request of 17 billion dollars over four years to be sent to Great Britain, France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium.

The Marshall Plan created an economic miracle in Western Europe. By the target date of the programme four years later, Western European industries were producing twice as much as they had the year before war broke out. Some Americans grumbled (complained) about the costs, but the nation spent more on liquor during the years of the Marshall Plan than they sent overseas to Europe. The aid also produced record levels of trade with American firms, fuelling a post-war economic boom in the United States.

Lastly, and much to Truman’s delight, none of these nations of Western Europe faced a serious threat of communist takeover for the duration of the Cold War.

SOURCE 1B

This source was written by an academic, Scott D Parrish, from the University of Texas in the United States of America. He analysed Evgenii Varga's (Soviet academic and economist) rejection of the Marshall Plan.

Varga put forward an economic explanation, arguing that 'the economic situation in the United States was the decisive (key) factor in putting forward the Marshall Plan proposal. The Marshall Plan is intended in the first instance to serve as a means of softening the expected economic crisis, the approach of which already no one in the United States denies'. Varga then went on to outline the dimensions (lengths) of the economic crisis, which he expected would soon overtake the United States. He anticipated a twenty per cent drop in production during this crisis, leading to the creation of a ten-million-man army of unemployed, and wreaking havoc (causing disaster) on the American banking system. As to the political effects of these economic difficulties, he concluded that 'the explosion of the economic and financial crisis will result in a significant drop in the foreign policy prestige (status) of the United States, which hopes to play the role of stabiliser of international capitalism'.

The Marshall Plan, wrote Varga, represented an attempt to forestall (prevent) this crisis. In his view, the United States found itself compelled (forced) to increase exports in order to avoid the onset of a serious economic depression. To accomplish such an increase in exports, the United States would grant credit to the European countries, even if they could not repay them. Varga observed that this expedient (action) would prove especially beneficial to 'monopoly capital'. He concluded:

'Seen against this background, the idea behind the Marshall Plan is the following: If it is in the interest of the United States itself to sell abroad American goods worth several billion dollars on credit to bankrupt borrowers, then it is necessary to attempt to gain from these credits the maximum political benefits.'

SOURCE 1C

This cartoon was published in the *Krokodil*, a Soviet magazine, in 1948. It depicts the effects of the Marshall Plan.

[From *Essential Modern History* by S Waugh]
This source was written by William R Keylor. He analyses the effects of the implementation of the Marshall Plan, both on Western European countries and the United States of America.

The economic consequences (results) of the Marshall Plan surpassed (were more than) the most optimistic expectations of its authors. By 1952, the termination date of the American aid programme, European industrial production had risen to 35 per cent and agricultural production to 10 per cent above the pre-war level. From the depths of economic despair the recipient nations of Western Europe embarked on a period of economic expansion that was to bring a degree of prosperity to their populations unimaginable (unbelievable) in the dark days of 1947.

In the meantime the donor nation derived (received) great commercial benefits from its financial largesse (assistance), as the Marxist-Leninist critics had forecast: more than two-thirds of the European imports under the plan came from the United States, which meant higher profits for American firms engaged in the export trade, as well as more jobs for the workers they employed. It is doubtful that the phenomenal (outstanding) growth of the American economy in the prosperous era of the fifties and early sixties would have occurred without the stimulus provided by orders for its goods and services from the other nations of the industrial world across the Atlantic that were rebuilding their war-torn economies.

[From The Twentieth-Century World, An International History by WR Keylor]
QUESTION 2: WHAT WERE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA?

SOURCE 2A

This source focuses on the opinions of historians Irina Filatova and Apollon Davidson, about the significance of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, which was fought in Angola between 1987 and 1988.

From the point of view of the Soviet military, the Angolans, Cubans, the post-apartheid South African government and many researchers, the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale was the turning point of the war, after which all the main goals of the war were achieved: South Africa had to withdraw its troops, Angola achieved relative peace and Namibia its independence. From the point of view of the South African military, there never was a 'Battle of Cuito Cuanavale', because, according to General J Geldenhuys, 'it had no strategic significance whatsoever. It played no role at all from whatever angle you look at it'. In fact, 'the Soviet alliance lost, because it did not manage to crush Savimbi and to demolish his capital, Jamba …'.

We shall leave this argument to military historians … But from a propaganda point of view, it was a disaster …

Russian researchers think that Cuito Cuanavale and the Cuban offensive in the south-west (of Angola) changed the balance of power of forces in the region, creating a favourable climate for the Angolan-Namibian settlement (New York Accords) … The truth is that, however many battles the South African Defence Force could claim to have won on the battlefield, they lost the crucial political battle, and the war with it.

[From The Hidden Thread. Russia and South Africa in the Soviet Era by I Filatova and A Davidson]
SOURCE 2B

The extract below is taken from a speech by Fidel Castro (leader of Cuba) at a rally that was attended by thousands of people in Havana on 5 December 1988. Castro defended the involvement of Cuban troops in the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

The Angolan government had assigned us (Cuba) the responsibility of defending Cuito Cuanavale, and all necessary measures were taken not only to stop the South Africans, but to turn Cuito Cuanavale into a trap, a trap the South Africans ran into. In Cuito Cuanavale the South African army really broke their teeth (lost its power) …

The United States had been meeting with Angola for some time, presenting themselves as mediators (negotiators) between the Angolans and the South Africans to seek a peaceful solution, and so the years went by. But while these supposed negotiations were taking place with the United States as intermediaries (negotiators), the South Africans had intervened and tried to solve the Angolan situation militarily, and perhaps they would have achieved it if it was not for the effort our country (Cuba) made. In fact the relationship of forces changed radically. The South Africans suffered a crushing defeat in Cuito Cuanavale and the worst part for them was still to come …

There are moments when difficult and bitter decisions have to be taken, and when that moment came, our party and our armed forces did not hesitate for an instant. I believe that helped to prevent a political calamity (disaster), a military calamity for Angola, for Africa and for all progressive forces. I believe that our actions (at Cuito Cuanavale) decisively boosted the prospects for peace now present in the region.

[From In Defence of Socialism: Four Speeches on the 30th Anniversary of the Cuban Revolution by F Castro]
SOURCE 2C

This source by Christopher Saunders explains the role that the superpowers played in ensuring that the Angola/Namibia Accords (New York Accords) were signed. The Accords were signed by Cuba, Angola and South Africa at the United Nations headquarters in New York on 22 December 1988.

As Crocker (Assistant Secretary of African Affairs in the United States of America) had successfully argued over months would be the case, the final agreement provided something for each party involved ... In the way the crisis was resolved, the two superpowers worked more closely together than ever, especially in the Joint Monitoring Commission that was established to ensure that the agreements were held to.

This chapter is concerned with ... why the crisis (at Cuito Cuanavale in 1988) was resolved as it was and did not escalate (increase) into something far more serious. Key to this was the coming into office of Gorbachev (1985) and the evolution (growth) of his 'new thinking', which made possible new cooperation with the USA. It began to be possible for all the parties to see that they could gain something by the settlement. Cuba and South Africa both had to withdraw from Angola ... They withdrew within the context of a new relationship forged (made) between leading personalities involved in the negotiations, and a new attitude towards the Soviet Union by the South Africans, who no longer saw communism as a bogey (monster) and the USSR as out to conquer the sub-continent ...

The superpowers played a critical role in the resolution of this crisis ...

[From Cold War in Southern Africa, White Power and Black Liberation, edited by S Onslow]
SOURCE 2D

This photograph shows various leaders signing the New York Accords at the United Nations Headquarters in New York on 22 December 1988.

Seated from left to right are: Magnus Malan, Minister of Defence (South Africa), Roelof Frederik ('Pik') Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs (South Africa), Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Secretary General of the UN, George Shultz, Secretary of State (United States of America), Alfonso Van-Dunem, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Angola), António dos Santos França (Angolan representative), Isidoro Malmierca Peoli, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Cuba) and General Abelardo Colomé Ibarra (Cuba).

QUESTION 3: WHAT CHALLENGES DID THE LITTLE ROCK NINE FACE DURING THE INTEGRATION OF CENTRAL HIGH SCHOOL IN 1957?

SOURCE 3A

This source focuses on the processes that occurred before the Little Rock Nine could enrol at Central High School in 1957.

... by the summer of 1957, school officials had selected 17 African-American students from over 200 applicants for enrolment at Central High School. School officials rejected many applicants because their grades were not high enough. Others were rejected because officials did not think they could handle the pressure of being a small minority in a school that was overwhelmingly white ... Still other African students dropped out on their own after the superintendent told them that they would not be allowed to participate in sports or any other extracurricular activity. As resistance to integration became more vocal in the summer of 1957 in Little Rock and elsewhere, a number of parents withdrew their children out of fear for their safety.

By the time the school opened, only nine African-American students were prepared to attend Central High School ... Despite the talk on TV and the radio and the newspapers, the 'Little Rock Nine' did not believe that integration would lead to violence in Little Rock. The first indication that I had of it was the night before we were to go to school. Governor Faubus came on TV and indicated that he was calling out the (Arkansas) National Guard to prevent our entrance into Central because of what he thought were threats to our lives. He was doing it for our own 'protection'. Even at that time that was his line. He said that the troops would be out in front of the school and they would block our entrance to Central, for our protection as well as for the protection and tranquillity (calmness) of the city.

**SOURCE 3B**

This source focuses on Elizabeth Eckford's experiences on 4 September 1957, her first day at Central High School.

The first scene Eckford saw when she got off the bus a block from Central High School was a sea of angry faces. She tried to walk to the school, but a jeering (mocking) mob blocked her path. All alone, her knees shaking, she pushed through the mob. She was trying hard not to show her fright. 'It was the longest block I ever walked in my whole life,' she said later. Eckford was one of nine students who had volunteered to be among the first African Americans to attend Central High School. When she left for school that morning, Eckford thought there might be trouble. But she didn't know that she would see hundreds of angry white people who had been waiting for her since early morning. Suddenly a shout went through the crowd. Elizabeth Eckford was attempting to enter the school.

Eckford turned back to the National Guards, but they did nothing. She walked back to the bus stop and sat down at the bench. Again, the mob surrounded her. 'Get a rope. Drag her over to this tree! Let's take care of the nigger*.' A white woman fought her way through the mob, screaming, 'Leave this child alone. Why are you tormenting (upsetting) her? Six months from now, you will hang your heads in shame.' The woman, Grace Lorch, sat down with Eckford on the bench. She put her arm around the girl and stayed there until the bus arrived.

Mrs Lorch rode with Eckford until she got off at the school where her mother taught.


*Nigger: A derogatory (offensive) term used to refer to African Americans*
SOURCE 3C

This photograph shows Elizabeth Eckford at the bus stop outside Central High School, surrounded by a mob of white American segregationists. Grace Lorch, a member of the local National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), is seen with her arm around Elizabeth Eckford.

### SOURCE 3D

This extract focuses on events that occurred at the house of Daisy Bates on 5 September 1957. It was after the Little Rock Nine were prevented from entering Central High School the previous day.

... The Nine gathered at the Bates home. It was the first time Elizabeth had ever met Daisy Bates. Segregationists, reporters and Faubus were to accuse her of sending Elizabeth into the mob deliberatively, to garner (gather) sympathetic publicity. Now Elizabeth let her have it, too. 'Why did you forget me?' she asked, with what Bates, who died in 1999, later called 'cold hatred in her eyes'. To this day Elizabeth believes that Bates, now lionised (praised) by everyone (a major street near Central High School has been named after her), saw the black students as little more than foot soldiers in a cause, and left them woefully unprepared for their ordeal.

For two and a half weeks, as lawyers, judges and politicians wrangled (fought) over their fate, the Little Rock Nine stayed home. Meantime, the image of Elizabeth and Hazel Bryan flashed around the world ... Langston Hughes wrote in the *Chicago Defender*, this 'one lone little Negro girl' would matter more than all the other allegedly more important players in the drama. The world press praised Elizabeth and condemned her attackers.

Again a federal judge ordered Faubus to stop interfering and admit the black children. Again a date was set: 23 September. Again, Daisy Bates notified the black families. By now the Eckfords had gotten themselves a telephone, but Daisy dreaded a conversation with them; how could she ask Elizabeth's mother to send her daughter back into the mob? Bates kept moving them to the bottom of her list. Once more, though, Birdie Eckford agreed to let Elizabeth go, and when the black children assembled at the Bates' home the next morning, she was among the first to arrive.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:


http://coolchicksfromhistory.tumblr.com


http://www.ahsd.org/social_studies/williamsm/The%20Mob%20at%20Central%20High%2 0School.pdf

http://www.ushistory.org/us/52c.asp


https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/ACFB73.pdf


Onslow (ed.). *Cold War in Southern Africa. White Power and Black Liberation* (Routledge, London)