



basic education

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Basic Education
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**NATIONAL
SENIOR CERTIFICATE**

GRADE 12

**HISTORY P1
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ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE CONTRIBUTE TO COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (USA) AND THE SOVIET UNION (USSR) FROM 1947?**SOURCE 1A**

The source below is an extract from an article titled 'Truman Doctrine for APUSH' by Dr J Roy, a History teacher for the Advanced Placement US History Programme (APUSH). It was published on 22 February 2019. The extract explains how the Truman Doctrine came into existence in 1947.

Once a Second World War ally (friend) of the United States, the Soviet Union was quickly becoming a real threat to democracy around the world. The spread of communism was seen as the most dangerous threat to world stability and Truman was determined to take a hard line with the Soviets. American diplomat and historian, George Kennan, proposed the idea of containment; this concept would become the centrepiece of the Truman Doctrine. Containment was the concept of applying counterpressure to every political, military or economic advance wherever and whenever the Soviets tried to make them.

While not an entirely new idea, it was never seriously envisioned (intended) as a foreign policy until March of 1947 after a presidential address to Congress by Truman. Due to their own domestic hardships, England announced that they would be unable to continue to militarily and economically support the democratic and strategically located nations of Greece and Turkey. Truman decided it was time for the United States to step into the role of world leader, a role left vacant by the declining British Empire.

The Truman Doctrine was based on the principle of containing communism where it already existed and not allowing it to spread to neighbouring European nations like an unstoppable virus.

[From <https://apprend.io/apush/period-8/Truman-doctrine>.
Accessed on 11 February 2022.]

SOURCE 1B

The source below is an extract from a speech delivered by Sir Harry Truman (President of the United States of America) to Congress on 12 March 1947. It outlines how the USA wanted to contain the spread of communism in Eastern Europe by financially and militarily supporting Greece and Turkey.

In addition to funds, I ask Congress to authorise (approve) the detail of American civilian and military personnel to Greece and Turkey, at the request of those countries, to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished. I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel.

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies and equipment, of such funds as may be authorised.

The assistance that I am recommending for Greece and Turkey amounts to little more than 1 tenth of 1 per cent of this investment. It is only common sense that we should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured (supported) by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife (conflict). They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died. We must keep that hope alive.

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms.

If we falter (fail) in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world – and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.


Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events.

I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely.

[From *Proclaiming the Truman Doctrine: The Cold War Call to Arms* by DM Bostdorff]

SOURCE 1C

The cartoon below is by Mark Hill, a USA cartoonist, and it depicts President Truman of the United States of America supporting Europe financially and militarily against a threat posed by the 'VIRUS OF COMMUNISM'.



[From <https://aprend.io/apush/period-8/Truman-doctrine>.
Accessed on 11 February 2022.]

MONEY IN US DOLLARS (\$)

BAGS OF US DOLLARS (\$)

NATO MILITARY TANKS

SOURCE 1D

The source below is an extract from an article titled 'The Stalinist Image of Canada: The Cominform and Soviet Press, 1947–1955' and was published in the *Labour/Le Travailleur Journal* (Spring 1988). It highlights why the Cominform was established and how it reacted against the Truman Doctrine.

During meetings in Szlarska Poreba, Poland, 22–27 September 1947, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties (Cominform) was established. It had nine founding parties from the USSR, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Italy and France. The Cominform, as the organisation came to be called, held only five conferences for public record ...

The occasion of the meeting in September 1947 was a striking shift in the fortunes of communist parties in Western Europe. Until early 1947 Communists had access to power within coalition governments in France, Italy and Belgium, a fact which had augured (meant) well for the united front policies ...

By the summer of 1947, however, the ... Truman Doctrine ... had been announced, and the powerful French, Italian and Belgium parties were removed from coalition governments. Some reorganisation was necessary. Some of the delegates to the Cominform meetings had been prominent in the Comintern; others were well-known from activities in their own countries or had known each other while in exile in the USSR.

... The essence of the Cominform position was presented in several notices in the fall of 1947. The first was a communiqué of 4 October 1947 which divided the world into two immutably (firm) hostile camps: the 'imperialist, anti-democratic camp' and the 'anti-imperialist, democratic camp'. The second took the form of an editorial in *Pravda* (10 October 1947), which confirmed the establishment of the Cominform and its role as an organisational bastion (defender) against an aggressively hostile, American-led, anti-socialist campaign.

[From 'The Stalinist Image of Canada: The Cominform and Soviet Press, 1947–1955',
Labour/Le Travailleur Journal, Vol. 21 (Spring 1988) by JL Black]

QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE STATISTICS (INFORMATION SHOWN IN NUMBERS) CREATE DEBATES AND CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALÉ (1987–1988)?

SOURCE 2A

The source below is from a book titled *The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale* by H Campbell. It sheds light on rival encounters between the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola/South African Defence Force (UNITA/SADF) during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale (1987–1988).

The purpose of Operation Modular was to capture (control) the military stronghold of the Angolans at Menongue and to set up a provisional government of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Angola. This was supposed to boost (increase) the image of UNITA in the USA and to give credence (belief) to the idea that UNITA had over two-thirds of Angola under its control.

A major battle took place on the Lomba River when the South African Defence Force (SADF) clashed with the forces of the People's Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), both with offensive weapons. After a fierce (powerful) battle the Angolans retreated (withdrew) to Cuito Cuanavale and the South African Defence Force (SADF) laid siege (guard). The commanders of the SADF had expected to overrun FAPLA in retreat but by the end of December the South Africans had lost more than 230 soldiers and UNITA over 1 000. The South Africans lost over 41 aircraft, three helicopters and over 31 vehicles.

As it turned out, the generals had to fight with the 9 000 troops who were on the banks of the Cuito River while the Angolans organised to fight a defensive war. More significantly, when the President of South Africa travelled to the front inside Angola, the Angolans requested the Cubans to assist in defending Cuito Cuanavale. The Angolans were holed up (stuck) in Cuito Cuanavale while the SADF carried out tremendous shelling (bombing). But in this instance the radar (system of detecting the presence, direction, distance and speed of aircrafts) defensive line of the Angolans was operational and the South Africans were on the banks of the Cuito River shelling Cuito Cuanavale without air cover.

[From *The Siege of Cuito Cuanavale* by H Campbell]

SOURCE 2B

The table below is from a book titled *THE SADF IN THE BORDER WAR 1966–1989* by an academic, Leopold Scholtz. It contains statistics provided by General Jannie Geldenhuys, an SADF army leader. It outlines a comparison of damages to the artillery suffered by the two warring (fighting) factions (SADF and CUBA/FAPLA) during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

*ARTILLERY	CUBA/FAPLA	SADF
Tanks destroyed	94	3
Armoured vehicles	100	5
Rocket launchers	34	0
Artillery guns	9	0
Logistical vehicles destroyed	389	1
Missile systems	15	0
Soldiers killed	4 785	31
Wounded	10 070	90
Aircrafts shot down	18	2
Helicopters	9	0

[From *THE SADF IN THE BORDER WAR 1966–1989* by L. Scholtz]

*In this context artillery includes the soldiers killed and wounded.

SOURCE 2C

This account of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale by Vladimir Anatoliyevich Korolkov, a Russian soldier who served in the south of Angola between 1986 and 1988, is taken from the book, *The Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale*, by G Shubin. It focuses on the views about General Geldenhuys and the statistics of damaged artillery during the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale.

I don't wish to insult General Geldenhuys (who is respected not only by his compatriots but also by his former enemies), but he cites (quotes), to put it mildly, incorrect data about the losses of the South Africans, in particular the aircraft. He does not mention the heavy losses of UNITA troops (hundreds of them died every day during major battles near Cuito Cuanavale in March 1988) and the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF), but only those of the SADF, a formation of only 40 men.

Moreover, he intentionally or unintentionally lumps (combines) together FAPLA with the Cubans, and, furthermore, he doesn't even remember SWAPO – three armies with very big differences concerning their levels of preparation and ability to fight. He also minimises the threat of Fidel Castro to seize the whole of Namibia to resolve the outcome of the war. Castro held, by March 1988, overwhelming military superiority in terms of numbers and capability, both on land and in the air.

The SADF were also defeated by the Cubans in several little-known battles after Cuito Cuanavale in April–June 1988. The South Africans started to blow up bridges on the Namibian border after the Cuban offensive towards the Namibian border from Cahama in southern Angola. This offensive was backed by some 700 to 800 Cuban tanks, 40 000 military personnel and 60–70 combat planes. The South Africans had two choices – to be kicked out of Namibia by the Cubans or sign the peace agreement that would herald (show) Namibian independence and allow themselves a face-saving disengagement (withdrawal). South African political and military authorities signed the accord (peace agreement) and declared themselves the political and military winners.

[From *The Bush War: The Road to Cuito Cuanavale* by G Shubin et al.]

SOURCE 2D

The source below, published in the *Conversation*, explains the controversies (contradicting arguments) concerning the outcome of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988.

There are still fierce (strong) arguments about how important the battle was, who won and whether the South African Defence Force was really defeated. That those who fought in the battle should have wildly different interpretations of its importance is not surprising.

The African National Congress (ANC) and its leader, Nelson Mandela, the Cubans and the Angolan government claim the South African army was decisively defeated. The objective of the South African government was to weaken the socialist orientated Angolan government, stop it from supporting the ANC and the Namibian South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) guerrillas from entering South African occupied Namibia.

But many South Africans who fought in Angola swear that they were never defeated, as South African author and academic, Leopold Scholtz, noted in his book on the battle.

Objective observers declared the end to have been a tactical military stalemate (deadlock) between the allied forces on either side. But it was a stalemate that led to major strategic realignments (changes) with huge consequences for the whole region; leading to the independence of Namibia, the withdrawal of South African and Cuban forces from Angola and the eventual dismantling (taking down) of apartheid. Nelson Mandela lauded (praised) the result of the battle during a visit to Cuba in 1991 to thank Fidel Castro for supporting liberation struggles in southern Africa.

[From <https://theconversation.com/its-30-years-since-cuito-cuanavale-how-the-battle-redefined-southern-africa-78134>. Accessed on 3 February 2022.]

QUESTION 3: WHAT WERE THE CHALLENGES ENCOUNTERED BY CIVIL RIGHTS PROTESTORS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE SELMA TO MONTGOMERY MARCHES IN MARCH 1965?**SOURCE 3A**

The source below outlines reasons for the first Selma to Montgomery march in the United States of America on 7 March 1965. It also highlights why it was referred to as 'Bloody Sunday'.

On 2 January 1965, Martin Luther King Jr and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) joined the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Dallas County Voters League and other local African American activists in a voting rights campaign in Selma where, in spite of repeated registration attempts by local blacks, only two per cent were on the voters' roll. The SCLC had chosen to focus its efforts in Selma because they anticipated that the notorious (shameful) brutality of local law enforcement, under Sheriff Jim Clark, would attract national attention and pressure President Lyndon B Johnson and Congress to enact (pass) new national voting rights legislation ...

In response to Jackson's death (a civil rights activist), activists in Selma and Marion set out on 7 March to march from Selma to the state capitol in Montgomery. While King was in Atlanta, his SCLC colleague, Hosea Williams, and SNCC leader, John Lewis, led the march. The marchers made their way through Selma across the Edmund Pettus Bridge where they faced a blockade of State Troopers and local lawmen commanded by Clark and Major John Cloud, who ordered the marchers to disperse. When they did not, Cloud ordered his men to advance. Cheered on by white onlookers, the troopers attacked the crowd with clubs and tear gas. Mounted police chased retreating marchers and continued to beat them. Television coverage of 'Bloody Sunday', as the event became known, triggered (started) national outrage (anger).

[From <https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/07/this-day-in-politics-march-7-1965-437394>.
Accessed on 6 February 2022.]

SOURCE 3B

The extract below is from part of John Lewis' (chairperson of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee – SNCC) testimony in a federal hearing within a week after the 'Bloody Sunday' incident. It gives an account of how the first march from Selma was stopped and the demonstrators were ordered to disperse.

ATTORNEY HALL: Then what happened?

JOHN LEWIS: He said, 'I am Major Cloud, and this is an unlawful assembly. This demonstration will not continue. You have been banned by the Governor. I am going to order you to disperse.' Mr Williams (an SCLC activist) said, 'Mr Major, I would like to have a word, can we have a word?' And he said, 'No, I will give you two minutes to leave.' And again, Mr Williams said, 'Can I have a word?' He said, 'There will be no word.' And in about a minute or more Major Cloud ordered the State Troopers to advance, and at that time the State Troopers took their position, I guess, and they moved forward with their clubs up over their ... near their shoulders, the top part of the body; they came rushing in, knocking us down and pushing us.

ATTORNEY HALL: Were ... was any words said by the State Troopers?

JOHN LEWIS: Well, the State Troopers ... most of them kept saying, 'Move back, move back, you niggers, disperse ... and things like that ...'

ATTORNEY HALL: After you were stopped, at some subsequent time, was tear gas used by the State Troopers, or some form of gas?

JOHN LEWIS: ... Well, when we were forced back, most of the people in line knelt in a prayerful manner; they had their backs towards the ... Selma, kneeling, the line all the way back was almost a spontaneous reaction on the part of all the people in the line as far back as you could see, and that time the Major ordered the State Troopers to put on their gas masks, and they started throwing gas, and people became sick and started vomiting, and some of us were forced off the highway and behind some buildings in the woods.

[From the National Archives, Southeast Region, Morrow, Georgia, Records of District Courts of the United States. Accessed on 12 February 2022.]

SOURCE 3C

The extract below is from a writing by Martin Luther King Jr, published in the book *A Testament of Hope, The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.* It provides a reflection on Martin Luther King's preparations for the Second Selma to Montgomery March on 9 March 1965.

We felt that the State Troopers, who had been severely criticised over their terrible acts two weeks earlier even by conservative Alabama papers, would never again engage in this kind of violence. I shall never forget my agony (pain) of conscience for not being there when I heard of the dastardly (shameful) acts perpetrated (committed) against non-violent demonstrators that Sunday. As a result, I felt that I had to lead a march on the following Tuesday and decided to spend Monday mobilising for it.

The next question was whether the confrontation had to be a violent one; here the responsibility of weighing all factors and estimating the consequences rests heavily on the civil rights leaders. It is easy to decide on either extreme. To go forward recklessly can have terrible consequences in terms of human life and can also cause friends and supporters to lose confidence if they feel lack of responsibility exists.

We determined to seek the middle course. We would march until we faced the State Troopers. We would not disengage until they made clear that they are going to use force. We would disengage (split up) then, having made our point, revealing the continued presence of violence, and showing clearly who are the oppressed and who are the oppressors, hoping, finally, that the national administration in Washington would feel and respond to the shocked reactions with action.

On Tuesday (morning), 9 March 1965, Judge Frank M Johnson of the federal district court in Montgomery issued an order enjoining (ordering) me and the local Selma leadership of the non-violent voting rights movement from peacefully marching to Montgomery.

[From *A Testament of Hope, The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr.*
by JM Washington]

SOURCE 3D

This is an aerial photograph taken at Dexter Avenue in front of the Alabama state capitol in Montgomery on 25 March 1965. It shows some 25 000 marchers who managed to arrive at Montgomery on their third attempt after leaving Selma on 21 March 1965.



[From *The Civil Rights Movement: A Photographic History* by S Kasher]

25 000 marchers

**ALABAMA STATE CAPITOL
BUILDING IN MONTGOMERY**

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

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