



basic education

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Basic Education
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NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE

GRADE 12

**HISTORY P1
EXEMPLAR 2014
ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 14 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION RESPOND TO THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN EUROPE AFTER 1945?

SOURCE 1A

This is an excerpt from a speech by US President, Harry S Truman, delivered on 12 March 1947, which focuses on the reasons why the Truman Doctrine was implemented.

At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is often a free one. One way of life is based on the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based on the will of the minority forcibly imposed on the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed election and the suppression of personal freedom.

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation (suppression) by armed minorities or outside pressures ... I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political process ...

It is necessary only to glance at a map to realise that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of a grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbour, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might spread through the entire Middle East ...

[From: *Public Papers* (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1947) by Harry Truman]

SOURCE 1B

This extract is from a speech delivered by United States Secretary of State, George C Marshall, at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. This speech initiated the post-war European aid programme commonly known as the Marshall Plan.

I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious ...

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products – principally from America – are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character ...

It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist ...

Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative (calming). Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation I am sure, on the part of the United States government. Any government which manoeuvres (tactical move) to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate (continue) human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

[From: <http://www.oecd.org/general/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.html>.
Accessed on 21 September 2013]

SOURCE 1C

Andrei Vyshinsky, a Russian foreign ministry official, had the following opinion about the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan:

The so-called Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan are particularly glaring examples of the manner in which the principles of the United Nations are violated, of the way in which the organisation is ignored.

... the United States government has moved towards a direct renunciation (rejection) of the principles of international collaboration and concerned action by the great powers and towards attempts to impose its will on other independent states, while at the same time obviously using the economic resources distributed as relief to individual needy nations as an instrument of political pressure ... The United States also counted on making all these countries directly dependent on the interests of American monopolies, which are striving to avert (turn away) the approaching depression by an accelerated export of commodities and capital to Europe.


It is becoming more and more evident to everyone that the implementation of the Marshall Plan will mean placing European countries under the economic and political control of the USA and direct interference by the latter in the international affairs of these countries.

Moreover, this plan is an attempt to split Europe into two camps and with the help of the United Kingdom and France, to complete the formation of a bloc of several European countries hostile to the interests of the democratic countries of Eastern Europe and most particularly to the interests of the Soviet Union.

[From: <http://www.slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/nss/documents/vyshinsky-criticism-of-truman-doctrine.htm>. Accessed on 21 September 2013]

SOURCE 1D

This cartoon was published in the Soviet Union magazine, *Krokodil*, in 1949. It was drawn by the team of Russian artists called 'Kukryniksy'. The title of the cartoon is 'Marshall Plan in Practice'. General Marshall holds life belts labelled 'For the French' and 'For the Germans' and, behind Marshall, 'For Italy'. (The words in the cartoon have been translated from Russian into English.)



[From: www.jhnclare.riet/cold-war8.htm. Accessed on 23 September 2013]

QUESTION 2: WHAT WERE THE DIFFERENT VIEWS REGARDING WHO WON THE BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALÉ BETWEEN 1987 AND 1988?

SOURCE 2A

This is an extract from an article published in the *Mail and Guardian Online* by Piero Gleijeses on 11 July 2007. Gleijeses was an academic on American foreign policy at the Johns Hopkins University in Washington DC.

In July 1987, the Angolan army (FAPLA) launched a major offensive in south-eastern Angola against Jonas Savimbi's forces. When the offensive started to succeed, the South African Defence Force (SADF), which controlled the lower reaches of south-western Angola, intervened in the south-east. By early November, the SADF had cornered elite Angolan units in Cuito Cuanavale and was poised (waiting) to destroy them ...

By early 1988, South African military sources and Western diplomats were confident that the fall of Cuito was imminent (about to happen). This would have dealt a devastating blow to the Angolan government.

But on 15 November 1987, the Cuban President, Fidel Castro, had decided to send more troops and weapons to Angola – his best planes with his best pilots, his most sophisticated anti-aircraft weapons and his most modern tanks. Castro's goal was not merely to defend Cuito, it was to force the SADF out of Angola once and for all ... He later described this strategy to South African Communist Party leader Joe Slovo: Cuba would halt the South African onslaught and then attack from another direction, 'like a boxer who with his left hand blocks the blow and with his right – strike'.

Cuban planes and 1 500 Cuban soldiers reinforced the Angolans, and Cuito did not fall. On 23 March 1988, the SADF launched its last major attack on the town. As Colonel Jan Breytenbach writes, the South African assault 'was brought to a grinding and definite halt' by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces ...

Powerful Cuban columns were marching through south-western Angola toward the Namibian border. The documents telling us what the South African leaders thought about this threat are still classified. But we know what the SADF did: it gave ground. US intelligence explained that the South Africans withdrew because they were impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and because they believed that a major battle 'involved serious risks'.

[From: <http://mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited>. Accessed on 17 September 2013]

SOURCE 2B

This extract is taken from the statement of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress (ANC) on the occasion of the 77th anniversary, 8 January 1989. At that time the ANC was a banned organisation in South Africa and its leaders were either in prison or in exile.

Compatriots, as the past year drew to its close, agreements of historic importance were arrived at concerning the security of the People's Republic of Angola and the independence of Namibia. These agreements represent a most decisive advance in the struggle for the total liberation of our continent and the establishment of peace in the region. We welcome them and look forward to their implementation without any delay.

These developments are a direct result, in particular, of the crushing defeat suffered by the apartheid war machine at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola. Humiliated, and its military doctrine and strategies in a shambles (mess), the racist army was forced to retreat from Angola in shame. The African National Congress pays tribute to the valour (bravery) and fighting skills of the armed forces of the People's Republic of Angola, the Cuban internationalist forces and the fighters of SWAPO, who have, in combat, buried racist Pretoria's aggressive dreams of conquering Angola.

What has been achieved is also a direct consequence of the struggles waged within South Africa and Namibia. These struggles, including the growing resistance to service in the racist army by many young South Africans and Namibians, contributed to the weakening of Pretoria's war machine. So did the international campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa in the economic, military and other fields.

[From: <http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/january-8th-statements-statement-national-executive-committee-occasion-77th-anniversary-anc>. Accessed on 15 September 2013]

SOURCE 2C

The table and text below has been taken from *The SADF in the Border War* by L Scholtz. Scholtz worked as a journalist for the Afrikaans newspapers *Beeld* and *Die Burger* during the 1980s when South Africa was involved in the Angolan war.

MILITARY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED AND SOLDIERS KILLED	CUBAN/FAPLA LOSSES (1987–1988)	SADF LOSSES
Tanks	94	3
Armoured vehicles	100	11
Rocket launchers	34	0
Logistical vehicles	389	0
Helicopters	9	0
Men killed	4 785	32*

*Scholtz uses official records to show that at least 10 more SADF soldiers died in this period. He also notes that the total SADF figures do not include UNITA losses, which were considerable, but have not been accurately recorded.

SOURCE 2D

Below is part of an interview that was conducted on 14 November 1995 between Pdraig O'Malley, professor at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, USA, and Constand Viljoen, chief of the South African Defence Force (SADF) between 1980 and 1985. Under Viljoen's command South African troops became directly involved in the civil war in Angola. In this extract, Viljoen responds to O'Malley's questions about the reasons for the SADF's involvement in Angola.

Constand Viljoen: The aim was never to win that war ... The aim was to check the expansion of communism in southern Africa and that they (the SADF) did. In fact I have always maintained that in three places in the world international communism got defeated. The one was here, southern Africa, the other one was in the Middle East where they could never really subject Israel, and the other was Afghanistan where the Afghan rebels dealt with the whole situation of the expansionism of communism from Russia. I think those three operational spheres caused the collapse of communism and, therefore, I always maintain that what we have done in Angola was not in vain and I want to emphasise it was never aimed at winning that war

Constand Viljoen: There was a great argument going on amongst the soldiers, many of them who were at that stage citizen force soldiers. The argument was whether they should attack Cuito and get on further or whether they should just remain at Cuito. Because remember, the whole Cuito battle was about protecting Jamba, Jamba being the main centre for Savimbi.

Constand Viljoen: ... it was not the intention to attack Angola conventionally. The intention of Cuito, the whole aim of the Cuito defensive system was to defend Jamba, it was not to attack.

Pdraig O'Malley: So was there any point where the (South African) generals, chiefs of staff, came back to the government and said we're at paralysis (unable to move) here, we're at one side of the river, they're at the other side of the river, we can stay here indefinitely, neither of us are going to win, neither of us are going to lose but it's rather pointless. Or did you achieve your strategic objectives?

Constand Viljoen: We achieved the strategic objectives. We wanted to facilitate the operation of Savimbi. That was the strategic objective.

[From: <http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00889/06lv00949.htm>. Accessed on 15 September 2013]

QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE PROTEST CAMPAIGNS IN BIRMINGHAM CONTRIBUTE TO THE GRANTING OF CIVIL RIGHTS TO AFRICAN AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN THE 1960s?

SOURCE 3A

The source below has been extracted from an interview with reverend Joseph Ellwanger, a white Lutheran minister, who was part of the committee that organised the 1963 Birmingham Campaign.

Birmingham in 1963 was about as segregated a city in the South as you can find. There were still signs over the water fountains. There were no black clerks in the downtown stores. There were no blacks in the police or fire department. And there were a lot of open threats on the part of the police commissioner, Bull Connor, against any attempt to gain some of these rights ...

There was not only the belief in the white community that blacks were inferior, but that belief was clearly articulated and was assumed as the basis for the segregation that had existed all these years ... many members of the Ku Klux Klan had ... almost a religious belief in their hearts, that we've got to maintain that kind of purity of the race or otherwise we're dooming ourselves and our future generation.

As we think about what white people were afraid of in terms of the possibility of an integrated society, part of it was simply the fear of the unknown. Perhaps even deeper was the fear of the Ku Klux Klan and their threats becoming a reality. In Birmingham, we had had something like forty bombings in the previous ten years, so it was not an idle threat ...

My role in the Birmingham demonstrations was basically being part of a committee of twenty that met to do the planning ... I can still remember those sessions with Dr King and Ralph Abernathy and Andrew Young, and it was an amazing experience of an openness towards everybody's ideas. There was no one who was not given the opportunity to help participate in the planning.

[From: *Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement* by Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer]

SOURCE 3B

The source below focuses on the strategies adopted by protestors, the reaction by state authorities and the impact of media coverage of the Birmingham campaign in 1963.

The Birmingham campaign began quietly with sit-ins on 3 April 1963 at several downtown 'whites-only' lunch counters. From the outset, the campaign confronted an apathetic (uninterested) black community, an openly hostile established black leadership and Bull Connor's 'non-violent resistance' in the form of police arrests of the offenders of the city's segregation ordinances. With no sensational news, the national media found nothing to report, and the campaign floundered (declined). But when Connor ordered out police dogs to disperse a crowd of black bystanders, journalists recorded the attack of a German shepherd on a nonviolent protester, thereby revealing the brutality that undermined segregation ...

In a desperate bid to generate media coverage and to keep the campaign alive ... the Children's Campaign was launched on 2 May 1963, in which black youth from area schools served as demonstrators. Trying to avoid the use of force, Bull Connor arrested hundreds of school children and hauled them off to jail on school buses. When the jails were filled, he called out fire hoses and police dogs to contain large protests ... African American spectators responded with outrage, pelting police with bricks and bottles as firemen opened up the hoses.

The media captured the negative images of Connor and his men suppressing the nonviolent protest of school children with brutal blasts of water cannons and attacks from police dogs. Front page photographs in the nation's newspapers convinced president Kennedy to send assistant attorney-general for Civil Rights, Burke Marshall, to Birmingham to secure negotiations that would end the violent demonstrations.

[From: <http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1358>.
Accessed on 28 September 2013]

SOURCE 3C

This photograph appeared in the *Daily News* during the Birmingham Campaign, 1963. It shows firemen who had been ordered to use their high-pressure hoses on civil rights protestors who are seated on the pavement.



[From: <http://www.dailynews.com>. Accessed on 25 September 2013]

SOURCE 3D

This is an extract from a televised speech given to the American public by President JF Kennedy on 11 June 1963 in reaction to events in Birmingham and other protests elsewhere.

The heart of the question is whether all Americans are to be afforded equal rights and equal opportunities, whether we are going to treat our fellow Americans as we want to be treated. If an American, because his skin is dark, cannot eat lunch in a restaurant open to the public, if he cannot send his children to the best public school available, if he cannot vote for the public officials who represent him, if, in short, he cannot enjoy the full and free life which all of us want, then who among us would be content to have the colour of his skin changed and stand in his place? ...

Now the time has come for this nation to fulfil its promise. The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city or state or legislative body can prudently (wisely) choose to ignore them.

The fires of frustration and discord are burning in every city, north and south, where legal remedies are not at hand. Redress is sought in the streets, in demonstrations, parades, and protests which create tensions and threaten violence and threaten lives.

We face, therefore, a moral crisis as a country and as a people. It cannot be met by repressive police action. It cannot be left to increased demonstrations in the streets. It cannot be quieted by token moves or talk. It is a time to act in the Congress, in your state and local legislative body and, above all, in all of our daily lives ...

Next week I shall ask the Congress of the United States to act, to make a commitment it has not fully made in this century to the proposition that race has no place in American life or law ...

[From: <http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/kennedy/civilrightsmessage.html>.
Accessed on 28 September 2013]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer. 1990. *Voices of Freedom. An Oral History of the Civil Rights Movement* (Vintage, London)

<http://mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited>

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<http://www.encyclopediaofalabama.org/face/Article.jsp?id=h-1358>

<http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/heroesvillians/g6/cs2/g6cs2s5b.html>

<http://www.nelsonmandela.org/omalley/index.php/site/q/03lv00017/04lv00344/05lv00889/06lv00949.html>

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Scholtz, L. 2013. *The SADF in the Border War* (Tafelberg, Cape Town)

Truman, H. *Public Papers* (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1947)

www.jhnclare.riet/cold-war8.html